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2by JOrg Niehans*
What is called the "international debt crisis", like every complex
problem, has many aspects. The presentpaper concentrates on one
of them-the unenforceability offoreign claims. Recent develop-
ments make the investigation ofthe implications ofunenforceable
claims for the international credit market particularly worthwhile.
The resulting picture ofinternational loans to developing countries
is inevitably incomplete, butit is nevertheless revealing and, in part,
novel.
Prevailing views on the international debt
crisis are based on the notion that the interna-
tional loans in question are essentially similar
to private domestic loans. In particular, the
"conventional wisdom" assumes that debtors
can be expected to service their debt to the
limit of their ability. From this assumption, the
current crisis appears to be a consequence of a
diminished ability to pay, partly due to higher
interest rates and partly to deteriorating eco-
nomic conditions. This view raises the hope
that a decline in interest rates and a return to
prosperity would cause the crisis to fade away.
It is argued in this paper that the conven-
tional wisdom overlooks a fundamental differ-
ence between private domestic loans and the
international loans in question. Economic
thinking about borrowing and lending is com-
monly based on the paradigm of debt enforce-
able through the law. In a cash transaction,
there is an immediate quid pro quo-the con-
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tract is self-enforcing. In a credit transaction,
the two parts of the exchange are separated in
time. As a consequence, there have to be pro-
cedures to enforce the fulfillment of the con-
tract. Because ethics are usually not enough,
enforcement becomes a problem. Western civ-
ilization has solved this problem through an
elaborate system of contract and bankruptcy
laws. Ifa debtor defaults on his obligations, he
forfeits collateral, that is, his assets can be at-
tached, impounded, or turned over to his cred-
itors by a bankruptcy court. By such means, the
debtor is put under strong pressure to live up
to his obligations, no matter how onerous, to
the limit of his abilities. Without these legal
enforcement mechanisms, modern credit sys-
tems could not have developed.
The circumstances are very different for in-
ternational bank loans to developing countries.
Most of these loans are made to governments
or guaranteed by governments. To the extent
they are loans to private firms, exchange con-
trol tends to subject them to a calculus similar
to that for government loans. There is usually
no collateral and, at least in practice, no access
to bankruptcy courts. While the seizure or at-
tachment of assets is conceivable, it is rarelyfeasible. This makes such loans legally unen-
forceable. I It is true that concern about "polit-
ical" repercussions, about "gunboat diplomacy"
or about disruption of trade may, to a certain
extent, substitute for legal remedies, but they
seem relativelY weak. World opinion today
tends to side with the debtors rather than the
creditor banks.2
The analysis in this paper is based on the
assumption that such penalties do not exist at
all. Its specific contribution is the development
of an "unorthodox" model in which concern
about the future availability ofcredit is the only
deterrent to default. No doubt this radical as-
sumption does not do justice to the complexi-
ties of reality because at least some traces of
enforceability are often present, and even the
principles ofethics may be ofsome help. There
are, indeed, historical cases of governments
faithfully repaying their foreign debts over dec-
ades. Recent developments strongly suggest,
however, that it is worthwhile to investigate the
conditions under which the international credit
system might still be viable under this radical
assumption.
In the last few years, the implications of
unenforceability have found growing atten-
tion.3 The present paper is written in the belief
that these implications are not yet fully under-
stood. Section I outlines the statistical contours
of the problem. Section II shows that unen-
forceable claims do not necessarily lead to cri-
sis. Sections III and IV analyze, respectively,
the objectives ofrational debtors and creditors.
Using a specific model ofcreditor strategy, Sec-
tion V pays particular attention to the relation-
ship between the rate of interestand the rate
of growth. Section VI extends this analysis to
the initial "overshooting" of the long-run debt
level. The exposition uses verbal, graphical and
mathematical arguments. A reader not worried
about mathematical precision can obtain the
main content of the paper by concentrating on
words and graphs.
Throughout the paper,itwill be assumed that
international lending, while important for the
levels of output and consumption at any mo-
ment, has only a negligible influence on the
rate of economic growth over decades, the lat-
terdepending mainly on population, natural re-
sources and technological progress. Although
this assumption may not be strictly valid, the
inaccuracies involved do not seem large enough
to invalidate the conclusions. Uncertainty
about future developments, although obviously
important in reality, also is disregarded in this
paper. The paper thus does not purport to pro-
vide a complete theory of lending with unen-
forceable claims, but concentrates on certain
aspects that seem to be important from the
point of view of current debt problems.
I. Statistical Contours
As a preface to the theoretical argument, this
section presents some statistical contours ofthe
currentdebt crisis. These contours are intended
to show that the interpretation developed in
this paper, although based on a somewhat rad-
ical assumption, is consistent with important
stylized facts. The data are taken from the
World Debt Tables (External Debt of Devel-
oping Countries), published by the World
Bank, 1983-84 and the first supplement. From
1978 to 1982, as Table 1 and Chart 1 show, dis-
bursements of private loans through financial
markets to public debtors ordebtors with public
guarantees were in the range of $39 to $48 bil-
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lion. Repayments of principal moved roughly
between $14 and $18 billion. Neither of these
flows displayed a pronounced trend. Interest
payments, however, increased dramatically
year by year from $6 billion in 1978 to $24 bil-
lion in 1982. As a consequence, net transfers to
the governments of developing countries
through the international banking market, rep-
resenting the net cash flow to the debtors, de-
clined from $19 billion to less than $2 billion.
With little exaggeration, it can be said that net
transfers came to a standstill.
This was immediately followed by the out-
break ofthe international debt crisis. Based onChart 1
Developing Countries:
Public and Publicly Guarantf3ed Debt to Private












Developing Countries: Public and Publicly Guaranteed Debt
to Private Creditors Through Financial Markets, 1973-1982.
(Billion Dollars)
1973 1975 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
Disbursements 8,652.0 14,225.7 25,349.0 39,188.4 47,995.8 40,708.0 47,134.7 42,770.3
Interest Payments 1,064.9 2,651.9 4,136.2 6,287.9 10,703.9 16,317.9 21,021.7 24,149.8
Principal Payments 2,487.6 3,104.4 6,808.6 13,853.7 18,081.2 16,002.6 17,754.0 16,880.3
Total Debt Service 3,552.6 5,756.3 10,944.8 20,141.6 28,785.1 32,820.5 38,775.7 41,030.1
Net Transfers 5,099.5 8,469.4 14,404.2 19,046.7 19,210.7 8,387.4 8,359.0 1,740.2
Source: World Bank, World Debt Tables: External Debt of Developing Countries, 1983-84 and First Supplement,
Washington 1984.
66the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) chro-
nology of bank-debt restructuring cases (IMF,
1983), there were 3 completed cases in each of
1978 and 1979, 6 cases completed in each of
1980, 1981 and 1982, and 20 cases completed in
1983 by early October with 8 cases still under
negotiation.4
It is difficult to believe that the association
of the virtual vanishing ofnet transfers and the
wave of reschedulings was a mere coincidence.
The nature oftheircausal connection, however,
is not obvious. According to one possible hy-
pothesis, borrowers asked for restructuring be-
cause rising interest rates, together with dete-
riorating terms of trade and worldwide
recession, had made the burden of their debt
unbearably heavy. Evaluated against the sta-
tistical contours, this argument is not convinc-
ing. It is true that total debt service, consisting
of payments on principal and interest, reached
a high amount. The relevant burden of inter-
national debt, however, is the net transfer ob-
tained by deducting from debt service the dis-
bursements on new loans. Since these
disbursements were also very high, there was,
until 1982, not a single year with a negative net
transfer. Far from carrying an intolerable debt
burden, debtors received net benefits through-
out, albeit on a rapidly declining scale.
The preceding argument was based on aggre-
gate data for all developing countries. A more
detailed picture can be obtained by focusing on
Latin America and the Caribbean. Table 2 and
the corresponding Chart 2 present net transfers
from 1973 to 1982. It is significant that their
amount, after reaching a high point of $11 bil-
lion in 1978, actually turned negative in 1982.
It is also important to note that this negative
balance was far from alarmingly large. The
overall burden of the debt cannot have been
very heavy.
The Latin American countries can be divided
into those with rescheduling between 1974 and
1982 and those without. The difference is re-
vealing. The 15 rescheduling countries present,
although at a somewhat lower level, the same
picture as Latin America as a whole. The 10
"good" debtors, however, show roughly stable
and positive transfers since 1977; in the last
three years, their net transfers actually in-
creased. This observation fits nicely into the
aggregate picture.5
According to another hypothesis, it is pre-
cisely the prospect of negative transfers that
triggered the debt crisis. This hypothesis is con-
sistent with the effective unenforceability of
most of these claims because it is an essential
aspect of unenforceable claims that the debtor
cannot be forced to accept negative transfers.
If, and when, they appear on the horizon, he
defaults. The present paper hypothesizes that
this hypothesis is largely correct.
It is true that most applications for debt re-
negotiation are accompanied by arguments in-
tended to show that acute balance-of-payments
problems make it impossible for the borrower
to pay his debts. Such arguments,
should not be accepted at face value. Balance-
TABLE 2
Latin America and the Caribbean: Net Transfers from Private Creditors
Public Debtors through Financial Markets, 1973-1982
(Billion Dollars)
1973 1975 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
All Countries 2,779.2 4,403.0 8,975.5 11,004.0 9,940.4 1,699.6 3,990.8 -2,317.7
Rescheduling
Countries 2,573.0 4,261.9 8,605.6 10,549.1 9,609.1 1,405.7 3,538.1 -2,791.6
Non-Rescheduling
Countries 206.2 141.2 369.8 455.1 331.3 294.1 452.9 473.6
Source: World Bank, World Debt Tables: External Debt of Developing Countries, 1983-84 and First Supplement,
Washington 1984.
67of-payments crises result primarily from a
country's own policies. They can be produced
at will, virtually overnight, simply by overval-
uating the exchange rate.6 The fact that IMF
lending, despite the collapse of the Bretton
Woods system, still is largely conditional on a
balance-of-payments crisis creates an incentive
for a country to let itself slip into such a crisis
whenever IMF lending is desired.7
The rough statistical contours presented in
this section, although far from proving any-
thing, suggest that net transfers, defined as the
difference between new loans and debt service
on old loans, may be of crucial significance for
international solvency. The following sections
elaborate on the theory behind this idea.
Chart2
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68II. Lending Without Budget Constraints
Disregarding other service items, this is equal
to the trade deficit. Depending on a and i, c
may be positive or negative, which means that
debtor countries can have trade deficits or
surpluses.
Is it possible for a debt expansion rate dif-
ferent from the interest rate to be maintained
forever? The answer depends largely on the re-
lationship between a and g. A rate of debt ex-
pansion significantly different from the rate of
economic growth would imply that debt either
increases beyond any limit relative to national
income or else virtually shrinks away. It is un-
likely, therefore, to be maintained for very
long. Within the framework of balanced
growth, one is dearly forced to assume a = g.
The above question thus pertains in essence to
the relationship between the rate ofgrowth and
the rate of interest.
In balanced growth with g = i, the net cash
rapidly enough, may end up never repaying
their aggregate debt. The same applies to grow-
ing economies. While the budget constraint is
faithfully observed for every singleloan, the
present value of aggregate cash flows to the
debtor may well be positive and even infinite.
The possibility of such a case over an indef-
inite period depends largely on the relationship
between a country's rate ofgrowth and the rate
of interest.8 Consider a country in balanced
growth at rate g with net foreign debt A. Debt
expands at the rate a = (dA/dt)(l/A). There is
clearly no reason why a should not be positive
in such an economy for an indefinite period.
Specifically, in a world economy in balanced
growth, there is a continuing capital flow from
the creditors to the debtors, growing exponen-
tially at the same rate as debt. Aggregate debt
is never repaid.
The net cash flow to the debtor country de-
pends on the difference between new debt and
the interest payments on the existing debt. It
corresponds to the net transfers of Section 1. If
there is a world interest rate i, the cash flow is
This section considers the long-run feasibility
of lending with unenforceable claims. Goods
exchanged in the market are, at market prices,
of equal value. Their exchange is nevertheless
ofmutual advantage because the goods, despite
their equivalence, have different utility for the
buyer and the seller. Similarly, the future pay-
ments promised by a borrower, properly dis-
counted, have a present value equal to the
amount he borrows; the present value of all his
cash flows is zero. This is the intertemporal
budget constraint for loans. Despite this con-
straint, the loan is regarded as advantageous by
bothparties because a dollar may have different
utility depending on the time at which it is
available.
An essential implication of an intertemporal
budget constraint is that once the loan is dis-
bursed, its present value to the borrower turns
negative. For example, once a homeowner has
received a mortgage loan, he has to make pay-
ments to the bank for years. Economically,
therefore, there is a virtually irresistible incen-
tive to default. To counteract this incentive,
loan contracts have to be enforced by collateral
and bankruptcy courts.
Such a budget constraint, by analogy with in-
dividualloans, is often postulated for an econ-
omy as a whole (McDonald, 1982; Sachs, 1983;
Sachs and Cohen, 1982). As a matter of fact,
the unenforceability of loans means that there
is no way of imposing this constraint. The par-
adigm of unenforceable debt thus implies that
borrowing is not subject to the familiar inter-
temporal budget constraint. The constraints
that take its place are the main topic of this
paper.
In the absence ofa budget constraint, a coun-
can forever borrow more each year than
what it needs to service its outstanding debt.
International lending begins to look like a
"Ponzi scheme." Economists, conditioned to
the paradigm of enforceable claims, tend to re-
gard such a state of affairs as intrinsically un-
sustainable. As a matter of fact, it may con-
ceivably be sustained, although only under
stringent conditions. Even firms, if they grow
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c = ~~ - iA = (a - i) A. (1)flow is zero at all times and so is the trade bal-
ance; interest payments are continuously rein-
vested. With g < i, the debtor needs a trade
surplus to finance the excess of interest pay-
ments over new lending; cash flows are nega-
tive andtheirpresent value is equalto outstand~
ing debt.9 In the case g > i, the debtor enjoys
a positive cash flow forever, which finances a
permanent trade deficit; the present value of
There seems to be no general reason to rule
out any of these possibilities. In particular,
there is nothing intrinsically unsustainable in a
situation in which a growing economy increases
its international indebtedness by more than its
interest payments virtually forever, thereby fi-
nallcing a·permanent trade deficit. lO Are the
creditors cheated by the debtors in such a case?
This·analogy to fraudulent bankruptcy would
bellllSplaced;"In successive generations, each
individual creditor obtains full repayment. It is
just that.the number of such creditors grows
continuously. Ifthe world suddenly came to an
erid, the last generation of creditors would in-
deed regret having made those loans, but its
regret wouldbeshared by those who hold other
assets.
m. The Borrower's Objective
The concept ofbalanced growth helps to clar-
ify one's thoughts on debt problems. The
world, however, is not in balanced growth. This
raises the question, under what conditions can
a debt crisis generally be avoided, despite the
unenforceability of claims. In the present sec-
tion, this question is considered from the bor-
rower's point ofview. The analysis assumes that
the rate of interest is given by the market, but
that the available amounts ofloans may be lim-
ited. Although potentially important, risk pre-
mia depending on the borrowing strategy ofthe
particular country are disregarded.
If a country with unenforceable debts is able
to maintain a positive cash flow at all times,
then its aggregate borrowing is not subject to
the usual efficiency criteria according to which
the marginal return on investment must be no
lower than the rate of interest. If loans, in ef-
fect, turn into gifts, they cannot be excessive
from the borrower's point of view. The over-
riding objective ofborrowing becomes the max-
imization of the present value of future cash
flows.
This Objective can be formalized by postu-
lating that the finance minister in the borrow-
ing country at time zero, in choosing the time
profile of debt, A(t), seeks to maximize
f[ ~~-iA(t)] e-itdt. (2)
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If this expression is infinite for several paths,
he .presumably will prefer the path that ap-
proaches infinity, in some sense, as fast as
possible.
In pursuing this objective, the borrower is
constrained not by the cost of future debt ser-
vice but by the willingness of creditors to lend.
If the interest rate is assumed to be given by
the world market, this constraint expresses it-
self in a quantitative limitation of the loan sup-
ply. The nature of this constraint will be dis-
cussed in the following section.
The essential point is that the optimal strat-
egy of the debtor may well entail default.11
More specifically, a "crisis" will occur if, and
when, the present value of cash flows becomes
negative over future time spans ofany length. 12




[ ~~ - iA(t)}-i(t - T)dt < 0 (3)
for aUe from T to infinity. The unenforceabil-
ity of contracts means precisely that the debtor
cannot be compelled to accept the prospect of
paying out more than he receives for an indef-
initefuture.13
The foregoing argument is illustrated in Fig-
ure 1. The blue curve describes a path of ex-
pected annual cash flows from now into the
indefinite future. These cash flows are concep-tually similar to·the. net transfers in Tables 1
and 2 and Charts 1 and 2 except that (1) they
relate to future periods and (2) the dollar value
for each year is assumed to be discounted back
to the present time at the appropriate interest
the left,butthese do nottrigger default because
the debtor expects positive cash flows of even
larger size in the future.14 In the other case,
represented by the dark lines, the upper curve
has a maximum that is never surpassed. At that
further servicing ofdebt
benefit.
Inreality, ofcourse, the shapeofthese curves
is not given to the debtor but depends in part
onthe debtor's own policies. Itis in the debtor's
interest to choose those policies that would
raise the upper curve as high as possible. In
particular, a path with infinite present value is
always better than any default path since the
latter's present value is finite. This means that
the debtor will often do his best to escape de-
fault. In contrast a path with solvency is not
necessarily better than default because, al-
though it never declines, it may never reach the
level ofthe default path at the crisis point. This
possibility is illustrated by the dotted solvency
path in relationship to the black default path.
It means that there may be no incentive for the
debtor to remain solvent.
curve by cumulating the annualcash flows from
time zero to a given future year. It thus repre-
sents the present value of all future cash flows
over a given future time period. For the mo-
ment, one may imagine that the shape ofthese
curves is imposed on the borrower from the
outside.
Under what conditions will the debtor, con-
fronted by these curves at time zero, detect a
future time T at which default is advantageous?
The two cases of solvency and default are illus-
trated by two variants of each curve. In the
solvency case, represented by light lines, the
upper curve has no (global) maximum. What-
ever the present value of future cash flows up
to a given time, there is a later time promising
a still higher value. There may indeed be sub-










71The shape of the curves <Uso depends on cir-
cumstances beyond the debtor's control. Thus,
a change in interest rates may produce a down-
turn where none was anticipated before. Even
more importantly, the shape of the cash flow
curve.is heavily influenced by the policies of
the lender. This aspect will be taken up in Sec-
tion IV.
In general, default will not take the form of
an outright· repudiation of existing obligations.
The.rationaI debtor will, instead, use the threat
ofrepudiation to induce his creditors to nego-
tiate a rescheduling of debt, a lowering of in-
terest rates, and an extension ofnew loans. The
intendtW result ofsuch negotiations is a further
increase inthe cash fl6wto the borrower, push-
ingthe maximum further up. As Sachs (1982)
pointed out, outright repudiation is most likely
if the creditors cannot be brought to the bar-
ga.iningtable;Thisis consistent with the obser-
vation that repudiation was frequent when most
lending tookthe form of bonds whose numer-
ousowners could not speak with a common
voice. Today, with most lending done through
banks, default usually appears in the form of
renegotiation.(but renegotiation does not nec-
essarily involve default).
IV. Strategic Planning for Creditors
If, with unenforceable contracts, debtors
have, loosely speaking, an unlimited demand
for loans, what is the appropriate strategy for
creditors? To prevent default, creditors have to
plan aggregate lending in such a way that the
present value offuture cash flows to the debtor
remains positive forever. This necessary con-
dition for solvency can be formalized as
L"'T~~ - iA(t)}-i<!-T)dt > 0 (4)
for all T. It will be c<Uled the solvency con-
straint.16 There must never be a moment at
which default would pay in this scenario. The
larger the present value of the cash flow at any
moment, the larger is the safety margin against
insolvency.
This constraint imposes no limit on lending
at a particular time. Rather, it relates to the
shape ofthe whole lending profile. Specifically,
it requires that the cumulative cash flow curve
in Figure 1 never pass an all-time maximum.
By and large, more rapid debt expansion in the
early periods makes default more likely at a
later time. Themore slowly debt expands in the
early stages, the better is the chance ofavoiding
a crisis. This intuitive argument will be elabo-
rated upon below.17
The solvency constraint, although necessary,
is not sufficient for avoiding a debt crisis. In
addition, each creditor must have confidence
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that the other creditorswill continue to lend on
an ever-increasing scale. It is difficult to state
precisely what this condition requires. For the
present purpose, it is enough to draw attention
to tW0a.~pects.First, the confidence of credi-
tors will>be difficult to maintain unless the path
of outstanding debt can be expected to merge
into a path of balanced growth. Clearly, an ex-
plosive debt profile with a debt ratio rising be-
yond any limit would not be acceptable, but a
debt ratio asymptotically approaching a finite
limit may inspire confidence.IS This idea can be
form<Uized by postulating that the rate of debt
expansion eventually should approach the rate
of growth.
Besides the expansion rate of debt, the cred-
itors will have to consider the level of debt at
a given time. This level determines the size of
the net cash flows, positive or negative, relative
to the national incomes of debtor and creditor
countries along a given growth path. With en-
forceable debt, the main criterion for judging
the optimal level of debt is the condition that
the marginal social product of the loan shall be
at least as high as the rate of interest. With
unenforceable claims, this criterion is clearly
not relevant. In fact, with unenforceable claims
there are no established criteria for optimal
debt levels. The decisive consideration seems
to be the share of their portfolios creditors are
willing to hold in the form of unenforceableloans. This will be calleq the "acceptable" level
of debt here. From the point of view of the
viability of the credit system, precise determi-
nation of the acceptable level is of little impor-
tance. The importantthing is that it is not sub-
A lending strategy along these lines requires
coordinated planning.19 With unenforceable
claims, decentralized decision-making is likely
to lead to crisis. The reason is that continued
debt service Oll.each loan depends crucially on
continued net lending by all lenders. This cre-
ates an externality somewhat analogous to a
congestion problem. Even full information of
all participants will not, in itself, prevent mar-
ket failure in such cases. In the absence ofcon-
certed action, international lending with unen-
forceable claims is a game of "devil take the
hindmost."
This is probably the basic reason that the fa-
miliar country risk indicators performed so
poorly in guiding the banks' lending activities.
Developedbyanalogy to domesticindicatorsof
creditworthiness, they put the emphasis onthe
debtor's ability to pay. This is appropriate for
enforceable claims because, if a debtor is able
to.pay, the .law can make him willing. With
unenforceabl<:; •••claims,·.however, •the···.ability to
pay loses its crucial relevance for solvency be-
cause a rational debtor, no matter how able to
pay, will not do so unless he can borrow the
required funds. The decisive factor, therefore,
is the willingness of creditors to lend.2o
For the same reason,even drasticimprove-
mentsineconomic conditions, in the debtor's
terms of trade, or in his export performance
may fail to resolve the debtcrisis. Ifdefault was
in the debtor's interest in adversity, it maystill
be in his interest in prosperity, no matter how
much his ability to pay may have improved.
With unenforceable claims, solvency depends
on the collective action ofthe creditors and not
on the economic strength of the debtor.
V. The Growth/Interest Relationship
Considering some particular debt profiles
will make the preceding argument more con-
crete, albeit at theloss ofsome generality. This
section concentrates on the significance of the
relationship between interest rates and the rate
of economic growth.
To relate the present discussion to that of
Section II, it is convenient to begin with an an-
alytically trivial case. Suppose at time t = 1, a
country with a growth rate g has no foreign
debt. With the world interest rate at i, it is now
perceived, both athome and abroad, that under
the given economic conditions the acceptable
level of foreign debt as described in Section IV
is A(l) = Aoeg• It is also perceived that, in the
long-run, the rateofdebt expansion cannot dif-
fer from the rate ofthe country's growth. There
is, therefore, a growth pathfor acceptable debt:
A(t) = Aoegt. (5)
Suppose at t = 1, the country obtains loans
in the full amount of Aoeg, thus "jumping" in-
stantaneously to the growth path. In this case,
73
the new net lending each year will be equal to
the annual increase in A,
dA = gA egt (6) dt 0'
while interest payments on the outstanding
debt are
iA = iAoegt. (7)
The net cash flow, therefore, is
c(t) = (g-i)Aoegt. (8)
If the growth rate exceeds the rate of interest,
there is a positive cash flow forever. As long as
parameters do not change, there will not be a
debt crisis. Ifthe two rates are equal, the situ-
ation is just barely viable. With a growthrate
lower than the interest rate, the cash flow is
forever negative-the borrowing country
would immediately default.
Figure 2 depicts this last situation. The two
curves represent, respectively, the growth path
ofnew lending and the.growth path of interest









the second throughout. The shaded area be-
tween the curves measures (negative) cash
flows.
This case, in all its simplicity, suggests the
consequences of an increase in interest rates.
Supposeinterestrates so far have lainwen be-
low growth rates, but that they now rise while
growth rates remain constant. Borrowers and
lenders would encounter the case in which i >
g, with the expectation that this will remain so
for a long time. With unenforceable debt, the
result would be an immediate debt crisis with
widespread default. Thesame result would hold
if, at given interest rates, the growth prospects
deteriorated.
In reality, the adjustment ofdebt to a higher
acceptable level usually takes time. This idea
can be formalized by postulating that debt fol-
lows the path given by
(12)
(10)
where a = Aoegis set equal to acceptable debt
at time t = 1, so that A(1) = O. The particular
specification of the adjustment term aft is ar-
bitrary. The important point is that actual debt,
beginning at zero, approaches its acceptable
level monotonically as shown by the debt curve
in Box 1.
New lending is determined by taking the de-
rivative of debt,
dA_ Agt a
-d - g oe + 2' t t
Initially, at t = 1, new lending is far above its
growth path, gAoegt, but approaches this path
in a V-shaped curve without ever crossing it.
Interest payments, on the other hand, are
(11)
They are initially zero and approach their
growth path from below.
The resulting cash flow is the difference be-
tween new lending and interest payments,
c(t) = (g-i)Aoegt + i a + ~ .
t t
The profile of cash flows depends crucially
on the relationship between g and i. First con-
sider the case g = i as illustrated in Box 1. In
this case, the growth paths of lending and in-
terest payments coincide. New lending, repre-
sented by the blue arrow, approaches this
growth path asymptotically from above,
whereas interest payments, represented by the
black arrow, approach the growth path from
below. Cash flows, measured by the vertical
distance between the arrows, never become
negative although they diminish over time.
Their present value, therefore, is positive
throughout. The debtor will never find it prof-
itable to default.
This is even more true if g > i. In this case,
the growth path of lending lies above the
growth path of interest payments. As a conse-
quence, the lending curve and the interest
curve, after first moving closer together, even-
tually diverge. Cash flows, after passing a min-
im.um, will increase beyond any finite limit. In
this case, even unenforceable claims are quite
safe.
In the opposite case, with g < i, unenforce-
able claims are not safe. As shown in Box 1,
the growth path oflending now runs below the















g<iing, therefore, while initially exceeding interest
payments, will sooner or later fall below them.
In the initial stages, positive cash flows give
debtors a strong motive to service their debt.
Eventually, however, the cash flow is bound to
become negative forever. With unenforceable
claims, therefore, the debtor will find it advan-
tageous to default. This leads to strong advice
for the lending banks: do not acquire unen-
forceable claims unless the borrower's rate of
economic growth exceeds the rate of interest.
(Clearly, the validity of this conclusion is lim-
ited by the assumptions underlying the present
analysis.)
What should the creditors' strategy be if
unenforceable claims have already been ac-
quired and the system has reached a point such
as T in the diagram for g < i? Iflenders, under
the.pressure ofincreasing default risk, succumb
to the temptation to raise interest rates and to
curtail lending, they will precipitate the crisis
they are trying to protect themselves against.
The only way to forestall a crisis seems to be a
combination of lowering the interest rate to a
level not in excess of long-run growth and con-
tinued lending at a level slightly in excess of
interest receipts. The cost of such a strategy to
the creditors would have to be weighed ag:linst
the costs of default.
VI. Debt Overshooting
The preceding cases are characterized by a
debt path that starts below the acceptable level
but approaches that level monotonically from
below. Debt is never too high compared to its
growth path. In reality, debt may initially ex-
pand so rapidly that it overshoots its growth
path, and one is inclined to suspect that this is
what happened in the late 1970s under the pres-
sure of lenders' competition. It will be shown
that this may lead to a debt crisis even though
the rate of interest does not exceed the rate of
growth.
Suppose creditors permit loans to expand ac-
cording to
A(t) = A egt + b-a - Q(13)
o t t2 '
where b- a > O. In this case, the debt pro-
file looks like the debt curve in Box 2. At
t = b/(b-a), the curve crosses the debt growth
path. It reaches the maximum amount of over-
shooting at t = 2b/(b-a) and gradually ap-
proaches the debt growth path thereafter.
There may actually be a phase of absolute de-
cline in debt, but this is not necessary.
To describe the implications of debt over-
shooting for cash flows, the following discus-




It can easily be ascertained that new lending is
initially, at t = 1, above its growth path, which
is given by gAoegt. At t = 2b/(b - a), the lend-
ing curve declines below the growth
reaching its maximum shortfall compared to the
latter at t = 3b/(b - a). Thereafter, it gradually
approaches its growth path from below (see
Box 2). The important point is that, with over-
shooting, new lending will eventually run below
the growth path.
The path of interest payments,
b-a b iA = gA = gA egt + g-- - g-
o t t2 '
has the same shape as the debt with an
amounts multiplied by g = 1. It crosses the debt
growth path at t = b/(b- a) and reaches the
maximum deviation from the latter at t = 2bl
(b- a). With debt overshooting, therefore, the
path of interest payments is bound to lie above
the growth path of debt except in the
stages.
This means that the cash flow to the '-',",'J'''',
while positive in the early stages, becomes neg-
ative and remains negative after the change.
With unenforceable claims, overshooting
makes a debt crisis inevitable. The the
overshooting, as measured by the parameter b,
the larger the negative cash flows become and
the more acute the debt crisis grows. Extending















straightforward. In thatcase,a rate of interest
safely below the rate of growth, despite over-
shooting, may avoid a crisis but can lead to one
as well. It is evident that with g < i, there is no
chance ofavoiding a crisis.
ThepoIicy conclusions suggested by this
analysis of debt overshooting, provided the un-
derlyingassumptions are·regarded as realistic,
may be summarized in three rules.
(1) If, in a country with a growth rate safely
above the interest rate, a higher ratio of
foreign debt relative to national income is
perceived to be acceptable, this ratio
should never be permitted to overshoot its
acceptable level or a repayment crisis
would emerge. Once this rule has been vi-
olated, efforts to slow down the excessive
debt expansion are likely to precipitate the
crisis.
(2) Ifdebt, even though it is not yet overshoot-
ing its acceptable level, is seen to be on an
overshooting path (as at P inthe crisis man-
agement diagram in Box 2), lending should
switch to a monotonic (non-overshooting)
adjustment path as described in Section V.
This would involve an immediate lowering
of the rate at which debt is allowed to ex-
pand. Gradually, debt would approach its
growth path from below. The same is true
for interest payments. New lending,incon-
trast, would be instantaneously reduced,
butits future decline also would be reduced
and possibly even eliminated. In any case,
new lending would remain continuously
above its growth path. As a consequence,
positive cash flows, and thuss()lvency,
could be maintained. This is illustrated in
Box 2, where the light curves representthe
original paths whereas the dark curves de-
scribe the. revised paths.
(3) Qnce the crisis point has been reached (as
at Q in Box2), a feasible emergencystrat-
egy may consist ofa combination ofalow-
erillgof iIlterest rates.to a level clearly.be-
low the rate of growth and continuous
relendi~g ofinterest payments. If compe-
tentlyexecuted over many years, such a
strategy, while achieving no overnight mir-acles, could gradually lead debt back to a
sustainable path. Such a strategy may ac-
tually be emerging from current interna-
tional negotiations, although perhaps with-
out clear insight into its underlying
principles.
VII. Concluding .Flernarks
Practical men of affairs, bankers, financial
writers and policymakers, can often be heard
to say, at least in less guarded moments, that,
"of course," a large part of the bank loans to
governmel.1ts of developing countries will
never, in the aggregate, be repaid. This paper
tries to develop the implications of this notion
for the viability of the international credit
system.
To focus. attention on the essential aspects of
the problem, the analysis in this article was
based on the assumption that concern about the
future availability ofcredit is the only deterrent
to default. Any other penalties, both legal and
extra-legal, were disregarded, as was the ethical
maxim that contracts shall be honored. In real-
ity, such penalties may exist and even ethics
may have some force. To the extent that they
do, the basic assumption of this paper may be
one-sided and the conclusions derived from it
invalid.
Despite this limitation, the paradigm of
unenforceable claims seems to shed light on im-
portant aspects ofthe recent "debt crisis". Over
thelast decade, banks have acquired vast claims
on foreign governments, claims whose enforce-
ability is weak and in many cases virtually non-
existent. In doing so, the banks probably did
not fully understand the implications of unen-
forceability. They also did not recognize the sig-
nificance of the relationship between a coun-
try's economic growth and interest rates. In
addition, the apparent profitability of the loans
during the early stages seems to have induced
the banks to "overshoot" the sustainable debt
level. It is hard to believe that the last was not
an important contributing factor to the recent
debt crisis. From thispointofview, the analysis
of international debt under the radical assump-
tion ofunenforceable claims may perhaps make
some contribution toward the prevention offu-
ture debt crises.
FOOTNOTES
1. The basic ideas of this paper are summarized in Nie-
hans (1984).
2. Despite the most severe pressures, including partial oc-
cupation, vanquished Germany after WWI could not be
compelled, on balance, to bear the burden of reparations.
Quite to the contrary, by defaulting on her foreign debt,
which amounted to roughly twice the cumulative reparation
payments, she extracted a vast transfer of resources in her
favor (Schmidt, 1934, p. 82 f.).
3. Among the most illuminating contributions are Aliber
(1980); Eaton and Gersovitz (1981 a,b); Sachs and Cohen
(1982); Sachs (1983); Cline (1983); and Swoboda (1984).
Important suggestions can be found in Wallich (1982).
4. Germany in the 1920s presented strikingly similar con-
tours. Before 1929, new foreign lending, with the exception
of 19~6, far exceeded interest payments and reparations.
In 1929,.the net transfer became negative, followed by de-
faUlt in the Summer of 1931 (Schmidt, 1934, p. 111).
5. It should be noted, however, that Mexico and Uruguay
differfrom .the group of reschedUling countries in that they
enjoyed s\.lbstantial positive transfers in recent years.
ThrQu~n rl;)sched\.lling, these countries seem to have in-
creased the net benefits from foreign lending long before
these benefitswere near the vanishing point.
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6. This point is rightly stressed by Aliber (1980).
7. The moral hazard inherent in IMF lending policies is
analyzed in Vaubel (1983). Tying the schedule of debt ser-
vice payments to exports, as is sometimes proposed,
would create still another moral hazard.
8. Inflation is not considered in this paper: Nominal rates
are thus equal to real rates throughout.
9. If debt in period t is e91A", the corresponding cash flow,
discounted to the initial period, is (g i) e(9 iliA". The
present value of cash flows, therefore, is
f(g i) e(9 illAodt = - Ao .
o
10. It may be noted in this context that for a debtorcountry
in balanced growth, the "Golden Rule" for maximum con-
sumption per capita requires a rate of growth in excess of
the rate of interest. The reverse is true for a creditor coun-
try. (For the world as a whole, unequal growth rates would,
of CO\.lrse, be inconsistent with balanced growth.)
11. The optimality of default also has been discussed in
the finance literature (for example, in Van Horne, 1976),
but there, with enforceable claims, optimality is seen from
the point of view ofthe creditor, while here, with unenforce-
able claims, it relates to the debtor.12. Essentially the same criterion for default is used by
Eaton and Gersovitz (1981 b, pp. 11-12).
13. Sachs and Cohen (1982) postulate a default penalty
in the amount of a certain percentage of gross national
product. It is the essence of unenforceability, however, that
there are no effective penalties of this sort.
14. This was pointed out by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981 b).
15. Eaton and Gersovitz (1981 a,b) argue that the benefits
from future borrowing are higher, and the likelihood of de-
fault therefore smaller, the more future income is expected
to fluctuate.Their benefit/cost calculus thus relates to the
traditional borrowing criteria. From the point of view of the
present analysis, these criteria are immaterial. Once the
cash flow is reversed, no amount of net benefits in the
sense of Eaton and Gersovltz would dissuade a country
from defaulting on its unenforceable debts.
16. Solvency, In the present context, is meant in the sense
of maintaining debt service. In the sense of positive net
worth, the concept has no relevance for unenforceable
government debt.
17. Eaton and Gersovilz (1981 b, p. 13) argue that unen-
forceable loans would be rationed to a sub-optimal level.
From the point of view of the present analysis, there is no
general reason for this to be the case. Even inefficiently
high lending might satisfy the solvency constraint.
18. There is evidently an analogy between this problem
and that of "bubbles" in financial markets.
19. This point is forcefully made in De Grauwe and Fra-
tianni (1984).
20. Strictly speaking, with fiat money and floating ex-
change rates a country is always able to pay its debts
because (1) it can print its own money and (2) this money
can be exchanged for foreign currency at some exchange
rate, although perhaps at very onerous terms (similarly,
Sachs and Cohen, 1982, p. 22). A historical example is
provided by German reparation payments in 1921,
promptly followed by suspension (Bresciani-Turroni, p.
93 f.; Graham, 1930, p. 30 f.; Stolper, et ai, 1967, ch. IV).
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